The determinants of financing obstacles. by Beck, T.H.L. et al.
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FINANCING OBSTACLES 
 






Abstract: We use survey data on a sample of over 10,000 firms from 80 countries to assess 
(i) how successful a priori classifications are in distinguishing between financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms, and (ii) more generally, the determinants of financing 
obstacles of firms.  We find that older, larger, and foreign-owned firms report less 
financing obstacles. Our findings thus confirm the usefulness of size, age and ownership as 
a priori classifications of financing constraints, while they shed doubts on other 
classifications used in the literature. Our results also suggest that institutional development 
is the most important country characteristic explaining cross-country variation in firms’ 
financing obstacles. 
 
Keywords: Financing Constraints, Investment Models 




* Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Laeven: World Bank; Maksimovic: Robert H. Smith School of 
Business at the University of Maryland.  We would like to thank two anonymous referees for useful 
comments and suggestions. This paper’s findings, interpretations, and conclusions are entirely those 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive 
Directors, or the countries they represent  1
 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF FINANCING OBSTACLES 
 
Abstract: We use survey data on a sample of over 10,000 firms from 80 countries to assess 
(i) how successful a priori classifications are in distinguishing between financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms, and (ii) more generally, the determinants of financing 
obstacles of firms.  We find that older, larger, and foreign-owned firms report less 
financing obstacles. Our findings thus confirm the usefulness of size, age and ownership as 
a priori classifications of financing constraints, while they shed doubts on other 
classifications used in the literature. Our results also suggest that institutional development 






Since a seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) [henceforth, FHP], a 
large body of empirical literature has emerged to estimate financing constraints of firms 
(see the surveys by Schiantarelli 1995, Blundell, Bond and Meghir 1996, Hubbard 1998, 
and Bond and Van Reenen 1999). This literature relies on the assumption that external 
finance is more costly than internal finance due to asymmetric information and agency 
problems, and that the “premium” on external finance is an inverse function of a 
borrower’s net worth. A firm is defined to be financially constrained if a windfall increase 
in the supply of internal funds results in a higher level of investment spending. 
Following FHP, it is usually assumed that there are cross-sectional differences in 
effects of internal funds on firms’ investment, so that investment follows the optimal path 
for a priori unconstrained firms but a sub-optimal path for constrained firms. Subsequently, 
researchers have applied different a priori classifications of firms to distinguish financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. 
In this paper, we use a unique firm-level survey database to focus on two questions. 
First, how successful are these a priori classifications in distinguishing between financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms?  Second, and more generally, what are the 
determinants of financing obstacles of firms?  The World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) is a unique firm-level survey database, which offers a number of advantages. 
First, the database provides information on the firm’s perception of the degree to which it is 
financially constrained or not. Therefore, unlike previous studies that inferred financing 
constraints from company financial statements using different methodologies, we can 
measure firms’ financing obstacles directly from the data. Second, the database contains  3
information on a broad cross-section of different types of firms in a large number of 
countries, including a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. Therefore, 
unlike previous studies that focused either on a sample of large, listed firms, or on firms in 
a limited number of countries, we are able to study how financing obstacles differ not only 
across countries, but also across firm size. As smaller firms are generally considered to face 
larger financing obstacles, it seems particularly important to investigate this largely ignored 
segment of the firm population. 
Our results indicate that many of the previously used a priori groupings are indeed 
effective in classifying financially constrained firms. However, we find that certain 
groupings are more effective than others. Specifically, age, size and ownership structure 
are effective categorizations of firms when studying financing obstacles; older, larger and 
foreign-owned firms report lower financing obstacles.  Variables capturing these firm 
characteristics not only enter statistically significant in the regressions, but also explain 
large variations in firms’ financing obstacles. 
We also explore whether financial and economic development helps alleviate the 
financing obstacles of the firms that report to be most constrained.  While we find that 
firms in countries with higher levels of financial intermediary development, stock market 
development, legal system efficiency and higher GDP per capita report, on average, lower 
financing obstacles, the underlying institutions driving both financial and economic 
development seem to be the most important country characteristic explaining cross-country 
variation in firms’ financing obstacles.  
While we explore the determinants of self-reported financing obstacles, we do not 
explore the relation between financing obstacles and the actual firm growth.  While firms 
report and rate certain obstacles, not all of them might actually be binding constraints.  4
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) assess the importance of self-reported 
financing, legal and corruption obstacles for firm growth using the same data and find that 
many of these obstacles are indeed binding. They also explore the effect of firm size and 
financial and institutional development on the relation between the reported obstacles and 
growth.  However, while Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) focus on the role 
of country-level financial and institutional development in overcoming the constraining 
effect of financing obstacles, we analyze firm characteristics that explain differences in 
reported financing obstacles. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related 
literature and the motivation for our analysis. In section 3 we discuss the data and report 
summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical methodology. Section 5 explores the 
firm characteristics that predict financing obstacles.  Section 6 explores the effect of 
country-level financial and institutional development on financing obstacles and section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Motivation 
Since the work by FHP, several methodologies have been suggested to test 
empirically the presence of financing constraints. Following FHP, most studies derive an 
empirical specification from the firm’s investment Euler equation that describes the firm’s 
optimal investment pattern. One model is the q-model of investment, pioneered by Tobin 
(1969) and extended to models of investment by Hayashi (1982). Financial frictions are 
introduced to the model by adding financial variables such as cash flow. An alternative 
approach, introduced by Abel (1980), is to derive an empirical specification from the firm’s 
investment Euler equation describing the firm’s optimal investment pattern. The Euler  5
model of investment has been applied and further developed by Abel and Blanchard 
(1986), Bond and Meghir (1994), and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1994, 1998), among 
others. A third approach, introduced by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), estimates 
a financial planning model to obtain the maximum growth rate firms can attain without 
access to external finance. By comparing these growth rates with the actual growth rates of 
firms, they are able to infer the degree to which firms are financially constrained. 
The first two approaches basically imply that financially constrained firms have high 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) question the validity of 
this interpretation. They show that under certain assumptions, investment-cash flow 
sensitivities may increase as financing constraints are relaxed. Almeida and Campello 
(2001) draw similar conclusions. Povel and Raith (2002) find a U-shaped relationship 
between cash flow and investment, further adding to the controversy about the 
interpretation of cash-flow sensitivities. There also exist a number of methodological 
problems with these two approaches. For example, Gomes (2001) shows that if cash flow is 
a good proxy for future investment opportunities, significant investment-cash flow 
sensitivities could arise even in the absence of financial frictions. More generally, Bond 
and Van Reenen (1999) point out that investment-cash flow sensitivities could also be 
indicating other sources of misspecification in the underlying investment models. 
Following FHP it is usually assumed that there are cross-sectional differences in 
effects of internal funds on firms’ investment, so that the investment equation should hold 
across adjacent periods for a priori unconstrained firms but be violated for constrained 
firms. This has led researchers to develop different a priori classifications of firms to 
distinguish financially constrained and unconstrained firms. From a theoretical point of 
view such sorting criteria should focus on a firm’s characteristics that are associated with  6
information costs. At the firm-level, empirical studies have grouped firms by dividend 
payouts (FHP), business group affiliation (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991), size and 
age (Devereux and Schiantarelli 1990), the presence of bond ratings (Whited 1992), the 
degree of shareholder concentration, or the pattern of insider trading (Oliner and 
Rudebusch 1992). Previous work has also identified a number of determinants of financing 
constraints at the country-level. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that financing 
constraints are lower in countries with more efficient legal systems. Love (2003) finds a 
strong negative relationship between the sensitivity of investment to the availability of 
internal funds and an indicator of financial market development, and concludes that 
financial development reduces the effect of financing constraints on investment. Laeven 
(2003) and Gelos and Werner (2002) find that financial liberalization relaxes financing 
constraints of firms, in particular for smaller firms. 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms into categories of “not financially 
constrained” to “financially constrained” based upon statements contained in annual 
reports. They classify firms as being severely financially constrained if these companies are 
in violation of debt covenants, have been cut out of their usual source of credit, are 
renegotiating debt payments, or declare that they are forced to reduce investments because 
of liquidity problems. Unfortunately, the problem with their analysis is that it is difficult to 
make such classifications based on information contained in annual reports. Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (2000) note that the firm-years Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify 
as most financially constrained are actually observations from years when firms are 
financially distressed. 
Our analysis contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, by using survey 
data on a firm’s perceived level of financing obstacles, we avoid having to imperfectly  7
infer financing constraints from financial statements of firms as in FHP and Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997). This allows us to not only test the validity of the a priori group 
classifications used in the literature to distinguish between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms, but also to assess more accurately the determinants of financing 
obstacles. Second, as the database includes firms of all sizes from a large number of 
countries with different levels of institutional development, we can determine more 
precisely the most important firm-level predictors of financing obstacles. 
The WBES includes a number of firm characteristics that we will relate to financing 
obstacles as reported by the firms themselves. Each of the firm characteristics we focus on 
in our tests has been used in the literature as proxy for information asymmetries or agency 
costs to split samples of firms a priori into groups of financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. First, we will test whether size or age predicts financing obstacles. 
The literature has proposed that smaller and younger firms are financially more 
constrained. For example, Gertler (1988) argues that information asymmetries are likely to 
be especially large for young and newly-established firms, because creditors have not had 
enough time to monitor such firms and because such firms have not had enough time to 
build long-term relationships with suppliers of finance. Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) 
and Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), among others, have used age and size as a criteria to 
classify firms into groups of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Schiffer and 
Weder (2001) have used the WBES survey to study how obstacles to doing business vary 
across firms of different size and report, among others, that perceived financing obstacles  8
are higher for small firms than for large firms.
1 We measure size by either the log of sales 
or dummy variables indicating whether the firm is small, medium or large.  
We also test whether stock market listing or business-group affiliation is correlated 
with financing obstacles.  The literature has proposed that information asymmetries of 
listed firms are smaller on average due to the listing and reporting requirements of stock 
exchanges (Oliner and Rudebusch 1992), and we therefore expect that firms that are listed 
on a stock exchange face lower financing obstacles.  Firms that belong to a business group 
are conjectured to face lower financing obstacles, because these firms have access to the 
internal cash flow of the group (Shin and Park 1999) and because these firms are more 
likely to have close ties with banks (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991).  
We also test whether geographical activity or ownership can explain differences in 
the reporting of financing obstacles. Multinational or foreign-owned enterprises have easier 
access to international sources of external financing and are therefore expected to report 
lower financing obstacles (Sembenelli and Schiantarelli 1996, and Harrison and McMillan 
2003). Government-owned enterprises are also expected to report lower financing obstacles 
since in many countries they receive direct budgetary support from the government and 
preferential treatment by government-owned financial institutions (Harrison and McMillan 
2003, and Laeven 2003).  
Since the WBES does not provide information on firms’ dividend payouts, we 
unfortunately cannot test whether firms with higher dividend payouts report lower 
financing obstacles, as presumed a priori in FHP. To control for the fact that country- or 
sector-specific characteristics might drive the responses of the firms, we will include sector 
                                                 
1 Schiffer and Weder consider the relation between firm size and different obstacles, such as financing, 
corruption, infrastructure and macroeconomic policies. Unlike them, we focus on financing obstacles and 
unlike them we consider a wide array of firm characteristics.    9
and country dummies in the regression analysis and allow for correlation between error 
terms of firms within countries.   
  Our methodology has the disadvantage of relying on unaudited self-reporting by 
firms. Thus, it is possible that while firms report financing obstacles, they are actually not 
constrained by them. However, Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004) show that 
many of these financing obstacles are related to firms’ growth rates, in the sense that firms 
that report financing obstacles tend to be growth-constrained.  In order to distinguish the 
self-reported constraints from actual constraints, we will refer to the former as obstacles. 
 
3. Data 
  The firm-level data are taken from the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES) which is a major firm-level survey conducted in 1999 and 2000 in 80 developing 
and developed countries around the world and led by the World Bank.
2 The main purpose 
of the survey was to identify obstacles to firm performance and growth around the world. 
Thus, the survey contains a large number of questions on the nature and severity of 
obstacles, such as infrastructure, crime, macroeconomic policies, corruption, legal system 
deficiencies and financing. The database also has information on firms’ characteristics, 
such as ownership, sales, employment, and growth. The data also indicate whether a firm is 
a multinational enterprise, i.e. whether it has operations in other countries, and the sector in 
which the firm is producing. In total, over 10,000 firms were surveyed, with the number 
varying across countries but with a minimum of 100 firms per country.  The sample of 
                                                 
2 The World Bank created the steering committee of the WBES and many other developed and developing 
country agencies were involved under the supervision of EBRD and Harvard Center for International 
Development.    10
surveyed firms in each country was constructed to reflect the sectoral, ownership and size 
structure. Data were mostly collected through personal interviews.
3   
Table I reports the composition of our sample according to size, ownership and other 
firm characteristics.  An important strength of the database is its broad coverage of small 
and medium firms; 80 percent of the firms included in the survey are classified as small (5 
to 50 employees) or medium (51 to 500 employees), while 20 percent are classified as large 
(more than 500 employees).  Nearly 40 percent of our firms are in the service sector, while 
more than 30 percent are in the manufacturing sector.  Only 10 percent of the firms are 
listed and even less are owned by business groups. Around 18 percent are multinational 
enterprises and a similar number of firms are foreign owned.  Around 12 percent of all 
firms are government owned.  Table A1 reports the number of firms for each country in our 
sample. 
In Table I we also report the average reported financing obstacle for each firm group.  
Management of the surveyed firms was asked to rate how problematic financing is for the 
operation and growth of their business. The perceived severity of the obstacles was 
quantified by assigning them values between 4, major obstacle, and 1, no obstacle. 36% of 
all firms rate financing as major obstacle, 27% as moderate, 18% as minor and 19% as no 
obstacle.  On average, larger, agricultural, non-listed, non-group-owned, national, 
domestically owned and government-owned firms report larger financing constraints.  
Some of these differences are also economically significant.  Take the example of 
firm size.  The “average financing obstacle” for small and medium firms is 2.87 and 2.85, 
respectively, while it is 2.59 for large firms.  This translates into a 38.5% (37.7%) 
probability for small (medium) firms that they rate financing as major obstacle, while it 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of the survey, see Batra, Kaufmann and Stone (2002).  The data and 
documentation are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wbes/index.html#wbes.  11
translates into a 28.5% probability for large firms.
4  Of course, this simulation does not 
control for other firm characteristics. 
Table II provides summary statistics.  In addition to the financial obstacle described 
above, firms were also asked more detailed questions to understand the nature of obstacles 
in the financial sector better.  These questions relate to: (a) collateral requirements of banks 
and financial institutions, (b) bank paperwork and bureaucracy, (c) high interest rates, (d) 
need for special connections with banks and financial institutions, (e) banks’ lack of money 
to lend, (f) access to foreign banks, (g) access to non-bank equity, (h) access to export 
finance, (i) access to financing for leasing equipment, (j) inadequate credit and financial 
information on customers, (k) access to long term loans, and (l) whether corruption of bank 
officials creates a problem. 
High interest rates top the lists of specific financial obstacles, followed by the lack of 
access to long-term loans.
5 More than half of the firms in our sample rate high interest rates 
as major obstacle.  Corruption of bank officials, on the other hand, is rated as only minor 
obstacle. More than half of all surveyed firms rate it as no obstacle.   
We also include several country-level variables in our analysis, all of which are 
averaged over the period 1995-99.  As indicators of financial development we use Private 
Credit, Value Traded and Law and Order.  Private Credit is an indicator of financial 
intermediary development and equals the claims of financial institutions on the private 
                                                 
4 To obtain these probabilities, we run an ordered probit regression on dummy variables for small and 
medium firms and then calculate the probability that small, medium and large firms report financing as major 
obstacle.  
5 To assess whether the responses to the survey question on interest rates simply reflect high interest rates in 
general (both deposit and lending rates) or a high wedge between deposit and lending rates, we explore 
correlations with bank- and country-level indicators of interest margins and spreads. The correlation between 
High Interest Rates and the net interest rate margins as share of assets is 50%, significant at the 1% level. The 
correlation with the interest spread, the difference between average lending and average deposit rate, is 55%.  
This significant relationship holds even after controlling for the level of real lending interest rates. Data on 
margins and spreads are from Bankscope and International Financial Statistics, respectively. 
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sector as share of GDP.  Value Traded is an indicator of stock market development and 
equals the total volume traded on stock exchanges relative to GDP. Both Private Credit and 
Value Traded have been shown to have a causal relation with economic growth (Beck, 
Levine, and Loayza 2000 and Beck and Levine 2003). Law and Order is an indicator of the 
efficiency of the legal systems and indicates the degree to which citizens of a country trust 
the legal system to resolve disputes. Institutional Development is an aggregate indicator of 
the institutional environment in which firms operate.  The underlying data are from 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) and include information on voice and accountability 
in the political system, the quality and consistency of regulations and regulatory 
enforcement in the country, political stability, the rule of law, the lack of official 
corruption, and the effectiveness the government bureaucracy.
6 Both Law and Order and 
Institutional Development increase in legal system efficiency and institutional 
development, respectively.  Finally, we include GDP per capita to measure economic 
development.  Table A1 lists the values for all five variables for the countries in our 
sample. Table II shows that there is a large variation in financial development across 
countries, ranging from Ukraine (0.01) to the U.S. (1.63) for the case of Private Credit.   
Panel B of Table II shows the correlation matrix between the general financing 
obstacle and the different firm characteristics we are considering.
7  Small and medium 
firms report significantly higher financing obstacles than large firms, while financing 
obstacles decrease in the age of the enterprise.  Agricultural  and construction firms seem to 
face higher obstacles, whereas service firms report significantly lower financing obstacles.  
The reported obstacles are significantly lower for listed firms, group-owned firms, 
                                                 
6 Unlike Law and Order, which focuses on legal system efficiency, Institutional Development is a much 
broader indicator.  
7 We do not include the correlations between the country characteristics, which are all positively and 
significantly correlated with each other.   13
multinationals, foreign-owned and privately-owned firms.  However, we also note that 
many of these firm characteristics are correlated with each other.  Firms in manufacturing 
tend to be larger, as are listed firms and enterprises that are part of a business group. Older 
firms tend to be larger, in manufacturing rather than in the service or construction industry, 
more likely to be listed, part of a business group, a multinational enterprise and foreign or 
government-owned firm. Listed firms are more likely to be owned by foreign owners or the 
government.  In order to determine which firm characteristics explain variation in financing 
obstacles, we therefore conduct multivariate analysis.  
 
4. Empirical model 
  The simple statistics presented in section 3 indicate that there are significant 
relations between firms’ financing obstacles and their characteristics. While these simple 
correlations are suggestive, they do not control for potentially confounding variables. We 
assume that the enterprise’s underlying response can be described by the following 
equation: 
Financing Obstaclei,k = α + β Firm Characteristicsi,k + γ Countryk+ εi,k, (1) 
where Financing Obstacle is either the general financing obstacle or one of the specific 
obstacles mentioned above, as reported by firm i in country k, and Firm Characteristics is a 
vector of firm attributes. These attributes include the log of age, firm size (log of sales or 
size dummies), sectoral dummy variables, and dummy variables for government-owned 
firms, foreign-owned firms, multinational enterprises, listed firms, and business group 
firms. Country is a vector of country dummies that allow us to control for unobserved 
country-specific factors that might drive firms’ responses.    14
Given that Financing Obstacle is a polychotomous dependent variable with a 
natural order, we use the ordered probit model to estimate regression (1). We assume that 
the disturbance parameter ε  has normal distribution and use standard maximum likelihood 
estimation.
8 Since omitted country characteristics might cause error terms to be correlated 
for firms within countries, we allow for clustered error terms. 
In a second step, we explore whether financial, institutional and economic 
development helps alleviate financing obstacles.  We therefore replace the country 
dummies with the country-level variables described above. 
   
5. Which firms report financing obstacles? 
The regressions in columns 1 and 2 of Table III indicate that the size, age and 
foreign ownership are the most robust predictors of financing obstacles.  Since we include 
country and sectoral dummies in all regressions, we control for country- and sector-specific 
characteristics that might influence firms’ responses in the survey. We present results using 
both the log of sales and dummy variables for small and medium firms as indicators of firm 
size. Both the log of sales and the dummy variables for small and medium enterprises enter 
significantly even when controlling for other firm characteristics that are conjectured to 
determine financing obstacles.  Small firms report significantly higher financing obstacles 
than medium firms, and both report higher financing obstacles than large firms.
9  Reported 
financing obstacles decrease in the age of the enterprise. Foreign-owned firms report 
significantly lower financing obstacles, even when controlling for other firm 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, we can assume a logistic function for the distribution of ε, resulting in the application of the 
logit model.  However, it is difficult to justify the preference of one over the other, and in reality, the two 
models seem to give very similar results.  See Greene (1997). 
9 We test whether the coefficients of small and medium firms in column 2 in Table III are significantly 
different from each other. The null hypothesis of no difference between the coefficients is rejected at the 10% 
level, suggesting that there is a significant difference between the coefficients of small and medium firms in 
column 2.  15
characteristics.  While firms that are not listed, are part of a company group or are 
multinational enterprises also report lower financing obstacles, the coefficients are not 
significant. We also find that government-owned firms report higher financing obstacles; 
this result is only significant at the 10% level and in only one specification, however. 
Finally, we note that manufacturing, agricultural and construction firms report larger 
financing obstacles.   
The regressions in columns 3-6 of Table III show significant differences between 
firms in developed and developing countries.  The regressions in columns 3 and 4 use a 
sample restricted to high-income countries, while the regressions in columns 5 and 6 use a 
sample restricted to middle- and low-income countries.  In developed economies, size 
seems to be less important in predicting firms’ financing obstacles, while age seems to be a 
robust predictor; sales enters significantly only at the 10% level and neither of the two size 
dummies enters significantly, while age enters significantly at the 1% level. There is weak 
evidence that foreign-owned and listed firms report lower financing obstacles, both 
variables enter negatively and significantly at the 5%-level in column 3 and significantly at 
the 10% level in column 4. For firms in developing countries size is a robust predictor of 
financing obstacles, while age is not. Foreign-owned firms in developing countries face 
lower financing obstacles, while there is weak evidence (10%) that government-owned 
firms face higher financing obstacles. 
Table IV shows the economic significance of firm characteristics for their financing 
obstacles.  We report the estimated probability that a firm describes financing as major 
obstacle depending on its characteristics. Specifically, we set all variables at their actual  16
value, except for the firm characteristic of interest.
10  In the case of dummy variables we 
first report the estimated probability for firms for which the dummy takes on the value one 
and then the estimated probability for firms for which the dummy takes on value zero.  In 
the case of continuous variables, such as sales and age, we compare firms at the 25
th and 
the 75
th percentile. In the overall sample and the developing country sample, foreign 
ownership and size (as measured by sales) can each explain more than a ten percentage 
point difference in the probability that a firm describes financing as major obstacle; this 
seems substantial given that 36% of all firms in the sample rate financing as major 
obstacle. Considering the size dummies instead of the log of sales still yields substantial 
differences between small and large firms, of around six to seven percentage points.
11 The 
differences are significantly smaller for developed countries. Age, on the other hand, seems 
to be the economically most important predictor of financing obstacles in developed 
economies; moving from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile predicts at least 5.5 percentage point 
decrease in the probability that a firm will describe financing as major obstacle.   
  The Table V confirms the findings that larger, older and foreign-owned firms report 
lower obstacles. Here we report the results for regressions of specific financing obstacles 
on firm characteristics.  As before we control for country and sectoral dummies, although 
we do not report them.  Here, we only report results using size dummies as size indicators; 
estimations using the log of sales yield similar results and are available on request.  The 
small firm dummy enters positively and significantly in most regressions, with the 
exception of access to non-bank finance, export finance and leasing finance. Medium-sized 
firms report higher obstacles than large firms due to collateral requirements, paperwork 
                                                 
10 Due to the non-linear nature of the estimation, we cannot interpret the regression coefficients as marginal 
effects.  
11 This is of course smaller than the effects reported in section 3, since here we control for other firm 
characteristics.  17
(10%), the need for special connection, and credit information.  Older firms seem to face 
fewer obstacles in most areas, but not all.  Specifically, age does not predict the degree of 
obstacles of high interest rates, paperwork and bureaucracy, banks’ lack of money and the 
corruption of bank official.  As in Table III, foreign firms report significantly lower 
obstacles in all sub-categories, while multinational enterprises do not seem to face lower 
obstacles, except when it comes to access to export finance and inadequate credit 
information (10%), where they actually report higher obstacles.  Interestingly, while we did 
not find a significant relation between the general financing obstacle and the fact that a 
firm is listed or not, when controlling for other firm characteristics, we do find that listed 
firms report to face significantly less obstacles when it comes to collateral requirements 
(10%) and corruption of bank officials. Surprisingly, listed firms report higher obstacles in 
their access to non-bank equity and interest rates (10%).  Finally, firms that belong to 
company groups, report to face higher obstacles due to corruption of bank officials and 
paperwork and bureaucracy (10%).   
Overall, the results in Tables III, IV and V consistently point to the young, small 
and domestically owned firms as facing higher obstacles than other firms. These results are 
consistent with some of the findings in the financing constraints literature. For example, 
using age as a criterion for grouping firms, both Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) and 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) find that younger firms have higher investment-cash flow 
sensitivity, suggesting these firms face higher financing constraints. However, using size as 
attribute has led to mixed results. For example, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) do not find 
significantly different investment-cash flow sensitivities for small and large firms, and 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) even find that large firms have higher investment-cash 
flow sensitivities than small firms. Our result that domestic firms face higher obstacles than  18
foreign firms is consistent with Harrison and McMillan (2003) who find that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is higher for domestic firms than for foreign firms. 
While Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) and Shin and Park (1999) find lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms that belong to a business group, suggesting 
these firms face lower financing constraints, we do not find that firms that belong to a 
business group report lower financing obstacles. We also do not find that being listed 
affects the level of financing obstacles, although Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) have used 
listing as a criteria for grouping firms and have found that listed firms have lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivities, suggesting these firms face lower financing constraints.  
We note, however, that the fact that our sample includes only few listed firms and firms 
that belong to a business group, might bias our results towards insignificant coefficients on 
these two firm characteristics. Finally, we do not find that being a multinational or being 
state-owned significantly affects the level of financing obstacles reported, although 
Harrison and McMillan (2003) found that multinational and state-owned firms were less 
financially constrained than other domestic enterprises as measured by investment-cash 
flow sensitivities. 
Our findings indicate that sorting firms according to their size, age and ownership 
structure (foreign versus domestic ownership) in order to test the effect of financing 
obstacles leads to reasonable classifications. Classification criteria such as being listed, 
being a multinational enterprise or belonging to a business group might be misleading, 
since they might represent spurious correlations. This also suggests that classification 
criteria based on size, age, and ownership are most useful in testing the presence of 
financing constraints and identifying financially constrained firms.  
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6. Firms’ financing obstacles and country characteristics 
So far we have considered firm-level characteristics and their relation with 
financing obstacles.  As described in section 2, previous research has shown that financial 
and legal system development alleviates financing obstacles. We therefore assess whether 
variation in firms’ financing obstacles can be explained by cross-country variation in (i) 
financial intermediary development, (ii) stock market development, and (iii) legal system 
efficiency.  Since financial development, however, is highly correlated with economic and 
institutional development, we include both GDP per capita and a summary indicator of 
institutional development, which is broader than legal system efficiency. Including 
country-level variables not only allows for testing the effect of specific country 
characteristics on firms’ financing obstacles, but also constitutes a robustness test for the 
firm-level regressions that only controlled for country-specific effects, but not country-
specific variables. 
The Table VI results indicate that firms in countries with higher levels of (i) 
financial intermediary development, (ii) stock market development, (iii) legal system 
efficiency, (iv) GDP per capita and (v) institutional development report lower financing 
obstacles.  Private Credit, Law and Order, and Institutional Development enter negatively 
and significantly at the 1% level, while Value Traded enters negatively and significantly at 
the 5% level and GDP per capita negatively and significantly at the 10% level. When we 
include the five variables simultaneously, however, only Institutional Development enters 
negatively and significantly at the 1% level; Value Traded enters negatively and 
significantly at the 10% level. Since these results might be driven by the high correlation 
between the country-variables and thus multicollinearity, we tried different combinations 
of the country characteristics; only Institutional Development enters significantly at the 1%  20
level when controlling for other country characteristics. The results also hold when we use 
Sales as size indicator instead of the size dummies.
12 
The effect of Institutional Development is not only statistically, but also 
economically significant.  According to the estimates (column 5), firms in Uruguay (75
th 
percentile of Institutional Development) face a 12% point lower probability of rating 
financing as major obstacle than in Kyrgyz Republic (25
th percentile). Overall, these results 
seem to indicate that broad institutional development is important in alleviating firms’ 
financing obstacles.  While firms in financially and economically more developed countries 
face lower financing obstacles, the underlying institutions driving both economic and 
financial development seem to be the most important country characteristic explaining 
firms’ financing obstacles. These findings also suggest that it is hard to distinguish the 
effects of financial, legal and economic development from the underlying institutional 
development. 
When we include country-level variables, the firm characteristics we previously 
found to be significant in predicting firms’ financing obstacles continue to enter 
significantly; larger, older and foreign-owned firms report lower obstacles.  Unlike in the 
Table III regressions, Multinational also enters negatively and significantly in all but one 
regression, indicating that multinational companies face lower financing obstacles; this 





                                                 
12 We also ran regressions controlling for growth, inflation and their respective volatility.  The significance of 
Institutional Development is not affected, while none of the macroeconomic variables enters significantly.  
13 When we re-run the Table III regressions with the sample limited to countries for which we have the 
country-level variables, Multinational enters significantly.  21
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we explore the firm characteristics that predict best firms’ financing 
obstacles.  We find that age, size and ownership predict financing obstacles best; younger, 
smaller and domestic firms report higher obstacles.  Categorizing firms by their age, size 
and ownership is therefore most useful when considering the effect of financial and 
institutional development on firms’ financing obstacles. 
Our results show that some of the a priori classifications used in the literature to 
distinguish between financially constrained and unconstrained firms are more useful than 
others.  Importantly, some of these a priori groupings appear to be misleading as they 
represent spurious correlations with other firm attributes.  Given the limitations of existing 
methods to estimate financing constraints directly from firm-level data, our results based 
on survey data are an important contribution in improving our understanding of which firm 
attributes predict best firms’ financing obstacles. 
We also consider the effect of country characteristics on firms’ financing obstacles.  
We find that firms in countries with higher levels of financial intermediary development, 
more liquid stock markets, more efficient legal systems and higher GDP per capita report 
lower financing obstacles.  The most important country characteristic explaining cross-
country variation in firms’ financing obstacles, however, seems to be overall institutional 
development.   
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Financing Obstacles Across Different Groups of Firms 
 
Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium firms 51 to 500 employees and large firms over 500 
employees. Listed firms are firms that are listed on a stock exchange. Group-owned firms are firms controlled 
by a company group.  Multinational firms are firms that have holdings or operations in other countries. 
Foreign-owned firms are firms with foreign ownership. Government-owned firms are firms with government 
ownership.  The general financing obstacle is a survey response to the question: How problematic is 
financing for the operation and growth of your business? Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle).  
  
Variable  Number of observations General Financing Obstacle 
   
Small 3,759 2.87 
Medium 3,726 2.85 
Large 1,726 2.59 
   
Manufacturing 3,068 2.81 
Services 3,684 2.69 
Agriculture 605 3.25 
Construction 784 2.99 
Other 280 2.78 
   
Listed 883 2.71 
Not listed  7,559 2.80 
   
Group-owned 557 2.62 
Not group-owned  8,177 2.82 
   
Multinational 1,598 2.48 
National 7,346 2.88 
   
Foreign-owned 1,616 2.43 
Domestic-owned 7,332 2.89 
   
Government-owned 1,115 2.96 
Privately-owned 7,807 2.79 
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Table II 
Summary Statistics and Correlations 
 
The general financing obstacle is a survey response to the question: How problematic is financing for the 
operation and growth of your business?  Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 
(moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). The other financing obstacles are survey responses to questions 
concerning specific financing obstacles, as specified in the questionnaire. Age is defined as the log of the 
years since establishment of the firm. Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium firms 51 to 500 
employees and large firms over 500 employees. Sales is the log of total firm sales.  Listed firms are firms that 
are listed on a stock exchange. Group indicates firms controlled by a company group.  Multinational firms are 
firms that have holdings or operations in other countries. Foreign indicates firms are firms with foreign 
ownership. Government indicates firms with government ownership. Manufacturing, Service, Agriculture, 
Construction and Other are sectoral dummy variables. Private Credit is the log of the claims on the private 
sector by financial institutions as share of GDP. Value Traded is the log of total value traded on stock 
exchanges as share of GDP.  Law and Order is an indicator of the efficiency of a country’s legal system.  
GDP per capita is in real terms and averaged over the period 1995-99. Institutional Development is a 
summary indicator of institutional development. 
Panel A: 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation
Maximum Minimum Observations
General financing obstacle  2.81 3 1.12 4 1 9,229
High interest rates  3.22 4 1.04 4 1 9,357
Collateral requirements  2.50 3 1.17 4 1 8,964
Access to long-term loans  2.63 3 1.26 4 1 7,024
Bank paperwork/bureaucracy  2.49 2 1.08 4 1 9,127
Need special connection  2.19 2 1.08 4 1              8.913 
Banks lack money to lend  2.11 2 1.20 4 1 8,645
Access to foreign banks  2.06 2 1.18 4 1 7,658
Access to non-bank equity  2.10 2 1.15 4 1 7,559
Access to export finance  2.08 2 1.18 4 1 6,711
Access to leasing finance  2.07 2 1.14 4 1 7,637
Inadequate credit/financial information  2.27 2 1.13 4 1 7,982
Corruption of bank officials  1.77 1 1.05 4 1 8,075
Age 2.34 2.20 1.10 6.40 0 7,933
Small 0.40 0 0.49 1 0 10,007
Medium 0.40 0 0.49 1 0 10,007
Large 0.19 0 0.39 1 0 10,007
Sales 9.87 12.21 8.00 25.33 -2.12 9,034
Listed 0.10 0 0.31 1 0 9,160
Group 0.07 0 0.25 1 0 9,444
Foreign 0.19 0 0.39 1 0 9,673
Government 0.12 0 0.33 1 0 9,645
Multinational 0.18 0 0.39 1 0 9,668
Manufacturing   0.36 0 0.48 1 0 9,141
Services 0.43 0 0.50 1 0 9,141
Other 0.04 0 0.19 1 0 9,141
Agriculture 0.07 0 0.26 1 0 9,141
Construction 0.10 0 0.29 1 0 9,141
Private Credit  0.36 0.23 0.36 0.01 1.63 74
Value Traded  0.09 0.01 0.19 0.00 1.06 79
Law and Order  3.77 3.63 1.21 1.50 6 63
GDP per capita  4,643 1,709 7,487 109 30.794 80
Institutional Development  0.05 -0.12 0.67 1.53 -1.14 80 29





Age Small Medium Large SalesManufacturing Services AgricultureConstruction Listed Group  Multinational Foreign
Age ***-0.11  
Small ***0.05 ***-0.31  
Medium ***0.03 0.10 ***-0.68  
Large ***-0.10 ***0.27 ***-0.40 ***-0.40  
Sales ***-0.18 ***0.38 ***-0.17 **-0.03 0.25  
Manufacturing  0.00 ***0.10 ***-0.17 ***0.06 ***0.14 ***0.07  
Services ***-0.09 ***-0.06 ***0.18 ***-0.10 ***-0.10 **0.03 ***-0.66   
Agriculture ***0.11 ***-0.05 ***-0.09 ***0.10 -0.01 ***-0.19 ***-0.21 ***-0.24  
Construction ***0.05 -0.02 ***0.04 0.00 ***-0.05 **-0.02 ***-0.25 ***-0.28 ***-0.09  
Listed **-0.02 ***0.06 ***-0.23 ***0.06 ***0.21 ***-0.03 ***0.08 ***-0.06 -0.02 -0.01  
Group ***-0.04 ***0.06 ***-0.10 **0.02 ***0.10 ***0.14 0.01 ***-0.03 -0.02 ***0.03 ***0.06  
Multinational ***-0.14 ***0.17 ***-0.19 -0.01 ***0.25 ***0.26 ***0.05 ***-0.03 ***-0.09 0.02 ***0.15 ***0.14 
Foreign ***-0.16 ***0.06 ***-0.20 ***0.04 ***0.21 ***0.25 ***0.11 ***-0.06 ***-0.08 ***-0.04 ***0.13 ***0.19  ***0.38
Government ***0.05 ***0.12 ***-0.24 ***0.15 ***0.12 ***-0.22 ***0.04 ***-0.05 ***0.05 ***-0.04 ***0.16 ***-0.05  ***-0.04 ***-0.06
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  30
 
Table III 
Financing obstacles and firm characteristics 
 
The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = α  + β 1 Manufacturing + β 2 Services + β 3 
Agriculture +  β 4 Construction + β 5 Size + β 6 Multinational +β 7 Government +β 8 Foreign + β 9 Group + β 10 
Listed+ β 11 Age + ε.  General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question “How problematic is 
financing for the operation and growth of your business?” Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor 
obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Age is defined as the log of the years since 
establishment of the firm.  Size is either the log of total firm sales or two dummy variables indicating small 
and medium firms. Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium firms 51 to 500 employees and large 
firms over 500 employees.  Listed firms are firms that are listed on a stock exchange. Group indicates firms 
controlled by a company group.  Multinational firms are firms that have holdings or operations in other 
countries. Foreign indicates firms are firms with foreign ownership. Government indicates firms with 
government ownership.  All regressions also include country dummies. The regressions are estimated with 
ordered probit. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. Regressions in columns 1 and 2 use the whole sample; regressions in columns 3 
and 4 a sample restricted to firms in high-income countries; and regressions in columns 5 and 6 a sample 
restricted to firms in middle- and low-income countries.  Countries are classified as high-, middle- or low-
income according to the World Development Indicators.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Manufacturing  0.236 0.290 0.275 0.389 0.237 0.268 
  (1.98)** (2.34)** (6.36)***  (3.63)***  (1.26)  (1.47) 
Services  0.084 0.117 0.148 0.24  0.084 0.093 
  (0.66) (0.90) (2.25)**  (2.20)**  (0.42) (0.49) 
Agriculture  0.523 0.595 0.262 0.332 0.533 0.581 
  (3.12)*** (3.42)*** (0.58)  (0.69)  (2.33)**  (2.56)** 
Construction  0.398 0.425 0.306 0.391 0.425 0.428 
  (3.07)*** (3.20)*** (3.16)*** (3.14)*** (2.15)**  (2.24)** 
Sales  -0.021   -0.025   -0.019  
  (3.10)***   (1.85)*    (2.58)***  
Multinational  -0.068 -0.056 -0.027 0.015  -0.070 -0.062 
  (1.31) (1.08) (0.30) (0.14) (1.15) (1.05) 
Government  0.094 0.112 -0.068  -0.064  0.117 0.139 
  (1.45) (1.73)*  (0.45) (0.47) (1.68)*  (1.93)* 
Foreign  -0.358 -0.343 -0.230 -0.190 -0.379 -0.369 
  (7.33)*** (6.94)*** (2.04)**  (1.91)*  (6.90)*** (6.49)*** 
Group  -0.038 -0.017 -0.183 -0.200 -0.008 0.025 
  (0.50) (0.23) (1.18) (1.53) (0.09) (0.30) 
Listed  0.028 0.056 -0.174  -0.126  -0.063  0.088 
  (0.49) (1.06) (1.99)**  (1.79)*  (1.03) (1.48) 
Age  -0.056 -0.043 -0.177 -0.171 -0.027 -0.010 
 (2.34)**  (1.79)*  (3.24)***  (3.21)***  (1.05)  (0.41) 
Small   0.229   0.264   0.228 
   (3.40)***   (1.33)   (3.21)*** 
Medium   0.140   0.114   0.149 
   (2.98)***   (0.94)   (2.85)*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.075 0.076 0.046 0.050 0.058 0.059 
Observations  6056 6179 927  971  5129 5208 
  31
Table IV 
Financing obstacles and firm characteristics – quantifying the effect 
 
Based on the regressions of Table III, estimated probabilities of rating financing as major obstacle to the 
operation and growth of the enterprises (Financing Obstacle=4) are presented. Estimated probabilities are 
calculated for each enterprise setting all variables at its actual value, except for the firm characteristic of 
interest. In the case of dummies, the first line reports the probability if the dummy variable takes on the value 
one, while the second row reports the probability if the dummy variable takes on the value one.  In the case of 
Age and Sales, the first and second rows show the probability at the 25
th and 75
th percentile of the respective 
variable.  The third row reports in bold the difference between the first and second row.  In the case of size 
dummies only the probabilities for the respective size dummies are reported. Age is defined as the log of the 
years since establishment of the firm.  Sales is the log of total firm sales.  Listed firms are firms that are listed 
on a stock exchange. Group indicates firms controlled by a company group.  Multinational firms are firms 
that have holdings or operations in other countries. Foreign indicates firms are firms with foreign ownership. 
Government indicates firms with government ownership. Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium 
firms 51 to 500 employees and large firms over 500 employees. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sales  0.427   0.209   0.421  
  0.315   0.166   0.320  
  0.112   0.043   0.101  
Multinational  0.374 0.372 0.253 0.175 0.373 0.388 
  0.351 0.353 0.250 0.179 0.350 0.367 
  0.023 0.019 0.003 -0.004  0.023 0.021 
Government  0.369 0.366 0.253 0.176 0.367 0.382 
  0.401 0.404 0.233 0.161 0.407 0.431 
 -0.032  -0.038  0.020  0.015  -0.04  -0.049 
Foreign  0.390 0.388 0.262 0.183 0.390 0.407 
  0.274 0.276 0.197 0.138 0.268 0.282 
  0.116 0.112 0.065 0.045 0.122 0.125 
Group  0.371 0.369 0.253 0.177 0.370 0.385 
  0.358 0.363 0.202 0.131 0.367 0.394 
  0.013 0.006 0.051 0.046 0.003 -0.009 
Listed  0.376 0.372 0.258 0.175 0.375 0.388 
  0.385 0.391 0.209 0.146 0.397 0.420 
  -0.009 -0.019 0.049  0.029  -0.022 -0.032 
Age  0.356 0.359 0.240 0.168 0.352 0.367 
  0.326 0.336 0.169 0.113 0.337 0.361 
  0.03  0.023 0.071 0.055 0.015 0.006 
Small   0.393   0.199   0.409 
Medium   0.363   0.161   0.381 
Large   0.317   0.135   0.330  32
Table V 
Specific financing obstacles and firm characteristics 
 
The regression estimated is: Financing Obstacle = α  + β 1 Manufacturing + β 2 Services + β 3 Agriculture +  β 4 Construction + β 5 Size + β 6 Multinational +β 7 
Government +β 8 Foreign + β 9 Group + β 10 Listed+ β 11 Age + ε.  Financing Obstacle is the response to specific issues in the financial sector that constrain 
the growth and operation of firms.  Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Age is 
defined as the log of the years since establishment of the firm. Size is a vector of size dummies; Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium firms 51 
to 500 employees and large firms over 500 employees.  Listed firms are firms that are listed on a stock exchange. Group indicates firms controlled by a 
company group.  Multinational firms are firms that have holdings or operations in other countries. Foreign indicates firms are firms with foreign 
ownership. Government indicates firms with government ownership. All regressions also include country dummies. The regressions are estimated with 
ordered probit. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
































Age  -0.006 -0.062 -0.042 -0.025 -0.036 0.006  -0.036 -0.037 -0.035 -0.048 -0.035 -0.009 
  (0.30)  (3.21)***  (2.02)** (1.53)  (2.29)** (0.29)  (1.70)*  (2.12)** (1.72)*  (2.23)** (1.73)*  (0.46) 
Small  0.133 0.246 0.150 0.197 0.232 0.113 0.166 0.058 0.051 0.107 0.169 0.228 
  (2.03)**  (4.19)*** (2.99)*** (3.29)*** (4.44)*** (2.04)**  (2.44)**  (1.14)  (0.72)  (1.55)  (3.26)*** (3.84)*** 
Medium  0.081 0.149 0.027 0.091 0.135 0.068 0.091 0.031 0.081 0.065 0.121 0.037 
  (1.46) (2.88)***  (0.58) (1.75)*  (2.95)***  (1.45) (1.44) (0.54) (1.12) (1.16) (2.62)***  (0.68) 
Listed 0.095 -0.091  -0.035  -0.108  -0.089  0.001 0.067 0.187 0.071 0.101 -0.065  -0.150 
  (1.69)*  (1.74)*  (0.47) (1.46) (1.52) (0.02) (1.10) (3.37)***  (1.35) (1.49) (1.09) (1.99)** 
Group  -0.007 0.038  -0.141 0.088  0.019  0.059 0.021 -0.069  0.018 -0.036  0.041 0.201 
  (0.10) (0.61) (1.62) (1.74)*  (0.27) (0.76) (0.28) (0.93) (0.20) (0.48) (0.62) (3.99)*** 
Foreign  -0.260 -0.252 -0.242 -0.108 -0.126 -0.121 -0.279 -0.240 -0.149 -0.234 -0.119 -0.107 
  (6.61)*** (5.76)*** (4.98)*** (2.41)**  (2.93)*** (2.62)*** (4.86)*** (4.78)*** (2.71)*** (5.91)*** (2.57)**  (1.99)** 
Government  0.103  -0.048 -0.020 -0.064 -0.082 0.001  -0.003 -0.030 -0.029 -0.050 -0.012 -0.119 
  (1.60) (0.75) (0.33) (1.05) (1.31) (0.02) (0.04) (0.43) (0.46) (0.75) (0.18) (1.54) 
Multinational -0.068 0.025  -0.005 -0.007 0.018  0.016  0.045 0.006 0.131 0.013 0.080 0.039 
  (1.61) (0.64) (0.09) (0.17) (0.49) (0.32) (0.92) (0.15) (2.62)***  (0.31) (1.80)*  (0.70) 
Pseudo R
2  0.103 0.052 0.100 0.052 0.041 0.099 0.066 0.051 0.061 0.085 0.047 0.102 
Observations 6163 5833 5507 5974 5813 5579 4830 4763 4156 4866 5074 5150 
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Table VI 
Financing obstacles and country characteristics 
The regression estimated is: General Financing Obstacle = α  + β 1 Manufacturing + β 2 Services + β 3 Agriculture +  β 4 
Construction + β 5 Size + β 6 Multinational +β 7 Government +β 8 Foreign + β 9 Group + β 10 Listed+ β 11 Age + β 11 Country + ε.  
General Financing Obstacle is the response to the question “How problematic is financing for the operation and growth of your 
business?”   Answers vary between 1 (no obstacle), 2 (minor obstacle), 3 (moderate obstacle), and 4 (major obstacle). Size is a 
vector of size dummies; Small firms employ 5 to 50 employees, medium firms 51 to 500 employees and large firms over 500 
employees.  Listed firms are firms that are listed on a stock exchange. Group indicates firms controlled by a company group.  
Multinational firms are firms that have holdings or operations in other countries. Foreign indicates firms are firms with foreign 
ownership. Government indicates firms with government ownership. Country is a vector of five variables. Private Credit is the log 
of the claims on the private sector by financial institutions as share of GDP.  Value Traded is the log of total value traded on stock 
exchanges as share of GDP.  Law and Order is an indicator of the efficiency of a country’s legal system. Institutional 
Development is a composite indicator of institutional development. GDP per capita is in real terms and averaged over the period 
1995-99. The regressions are estimated with ordered probit. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age  -0.084 -0.121 -0.130 -0.062 -0.033 -0.078 
  (2.94)*** (4.45)*** (5.67)*** (2.53)**  (1.18)  (2.77)*** 
Small  0.183 0.171 0.284 0.142 0.186 0.242 
  (2.40)** (2.21)** (3.69)***  (1.57)  (2.15)** (3.40)*** 
Medium  0.118 0.124 0.173 0.154 0.165 0.148 
  (2.24)**  (2.17)**  (2.90)*** (2.98)*** (3.46)*** (2.69)*** 
Listed  0.008 0.057 -0.060  0.057 0.046 -0.090 
  (0.13) (0.88) (0.76) (0.75) (0.72) (1.57) 
Group  0.030 0.024 -0.017  0.002 0.023 0.023 
  (0.41) (0.30) (0.22) (0.03) (0.32) (0.27) 
Foreign  -0.291 -0.304 -0.292 -0.355 -0.331 -0.252 
  (6.20)*** (6.40)*** (5.43)*** (7.30)*** (6.77)*** (4.76)*** 
Government  0.077 0.070 0.151 0.125 0.101 0.058 
  (0.69) (0.66) (1.36) (1.44) (1.22) (0.58) 
Multinational  -0.152 -0.147 -0.152 -0.127 -0.106 -0.104 
  (2.66)***  (2.47)** (2.49)** (1.99)** (1.90)*  (1.56) 
Private  Credit  -0.142      0.108 
  (2.71)***      (1.42) 
Value  Traded   -0.050     -0.037 
   (2.37)**     (1.85)* 
Law and Order      -0.175      0.073 
    (4.84)***    (1.28) 
GDP per capita        -0.107    0.009 
     (1.73)*   (0.17) 
Institutional       -0.340  -0.585 
Development      (5.60)***  (4.14)*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.036 0.032 0.042 0.029 0.039 0.052 
















Albania 163  0.00 3.63 807 -0.71
Argentina 100 0.17 0.04 4.13 8,000 0.33
Armenia 125 0.04 0.00  844 -0.44
Azerbaijan 128  0.00  408 -0.78
Bangladesh 50 0.22 0.01 2.13 339 -0.39
Belarus 125 0.06 0.00  2,235 -0.76
Belize 50 0.41 0.00  2,738 0.54
Bolivia 100 0.40 0.00 2.13 939 0.02
Bosnia 102  0.00  1,178 -0.99
Botswana 101 0.12 0.01 4.75 3,593 0.56
Brazil 201 0.28 0.13 3.50 4,492 0.00
Bulgaria 125 0.10 0.00 4.88 1,415 0.01
Cambodia  326    282 -0.39
Cameroon 57 0.14 0.00 2.75 631 -0.73
Canada 101 0.81 0.33 6.00 20,549 1.43
Chile 100 0.59 0.08 4.50 5,003 0.87
China 101 0.83 0.18 4.38 676 -0.20
Colombia 101 0.31 0.01 1.50 2,381 -0.41
Costa Rica  100 0.15 0.00 4.00 3,692 0.81
Cote d'Ivoire  97 0.26 0.00 2.88 763 -0.19
Croatia 127 0.00 0.01  3,845 0.03
Czech Republic 137 0.57 0.10 5.80 5,159 0.68
Dominican Republic  111 0.23 0.00 3.63 1,712 -0.11
Ecuador 100 0.21 0.01 4.00 1,538 -0.32
Egypt 102 0.33 0.02 3.13 1,108 -0.15
El Salvador  104 0.28 0.00 2.25 1,706 -0.03
Estonia 132 0.13 0.10  3,663 0.61
Ethiopia 105 0.20 0.00 3.00 109 -0.12
France 99 0.91 0.20 5.63 27,720 1.02
Georgia 129  0.00  411 -0.61
Germany 100 1.00 0.32 6.00 30,794 1.37
Ghana 119 0.05 0.00 3.00 393 -0.14
Great Britain  90 1.13 0.58 5.75 20,187 1.50
Guatemala 106 0.15 0.00 2.38 1,503 -0.50
Haiti 103 0.11 0.00 1.88 369 -1.14
Honduras 100 0.26 0.02 2.75 708 -0.43
Hungary 129 0.33 0.01 5.38 4,706 0.87
India 210 0.23 0.09 3.13 414 0.00
Indonesia 99 0.47 0.08 3.88 1,045 -0.76
Italy 100 0.58 0.11 5.25 19,  646 0.91
Kazakhstan 127 0.09 0.00  1,315 -0.53
Kenya 112 0.32 0.01 3.50 339 -0.78
Kyrgyz Republic  125 0.06 0.00  800 -0.42
Lithuania 112 0.12 0.01  1,908 0.26













Malawi 55 0.11 0.00 2.88 154 -0.17
Malaysia 100 1.07 1.06 4.13 4,536 0.51
Mexico 100 0.23 0.12 3.00 3,395 -0.07
Moldavia 125 0.06 0.04  668 -0.20
Namibia 95 0.38 0.01 4.50 2,325 0.47
Nicaragua 100 0.25  3.00 435 -0.41
Nigeria 93 0.09 0.00 2.63 254 -1.00
Pakistan 103 0.23 0.07 2.38 506 -0.59
Panama 100 0.62 0.00 2.63 3,124 0.11
Peru 108 0.12 0.04 2.25 2,335 -0.18
Philippines 100 0.36 0.15 2.88 1,126 0.21
Poland 225 0.09 0.03 5.25 3,216 0.70
Portugal 100 0.62 0.12 5.25 11,582 1.20
Romania 125 0.09 0.00 4.38 1,372 -0.08
Russia 525 0.08 0.01 3.63 2,224 -0.54
Senegal 124 0.21 0.00 2.38 563 -0.30
Singapore 100 1.02 0.69 5.50 24,948 1.44
Slovakia 129 0.29 0.07  3,805 0.28
Slovenia 125 0.23 0.02  10,233 0.85
South Africa  121 0.96 0.17 2.75 3,925 0.11
Spain 104 0.80 0.35 5.38 15,858 1.11
Sweden 102 1.12 0.40 6.00 28,258 1.53
Tanzania 83 0.09 0.00 4.38 182 -0.13
Thailand 422 1.15 0.38 4.63 2,836 0.15
Trinidad and Tobago  101 0.46 0.02 4.00 4,526 0.59
Tunisia 52 0.60 0.01 3.88 2,200 0.30
Turkey 150 0.14 0.16 3.63 2,994 -0.33
Uganda 137 0.03 0.00 2.88 324 -0.34
Ukraine 225 0.01 0.00  867 -0.58
Uruguay 100 0.25 0.00 3.00 6,114 0.56
USA 100 1.63 0.73 6.00 29,250 1.29
Uzbekistan 125  0.00  448 -1.04
Venezuela 100 0.16 0.03 4.00 3,483 -0.37
West Bank-Gaza  93  0.00 
Zambia 84 0.06 0.00 2.88 394 -0.20
Zimbabwe 129 0.25 0.02 3.50 693 -0.52
 
 
 